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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
the instant case seem to discern this danger, and would hold that the lower
court abused its discretion in allowing the habeas corpus writ.
JUDICIAL REVIEw OF DISmiSSAL OF POLICE OFFICER

A policeman of the City of New York may not be dismissed from the
force without a hearing before the Commissioner of Police or his deputy.10 Such
a determination is reviewable by the courts in an Article 78 proceeding when
"any rule of law affecting the rights of the parties thereto has been violated
to the prejudice of the petitioner.""
In Grottano v. Kennedy'2 petitioner's dismissal from the New York City
police force was based on two sets of charges of violation of the department
rules and regulations. The first set were charges connected with the running
of an escort service for local merchants. A hearing on these charges was
scheduled for June 4th but was adjourned until June 27th so that the Corporation Counsel could serve a bill of particulars on petitioner, which bill was
not served until the morning of June 27th. When on that date petitioner
refused to go to trial, against the Commissioner's orders, an additional set of
charges for insubordination were preferred for this refusal. On July 11th a
hearing was convened on both sets of charges. On advise of counsel defendant
refused to participate unless an earlier set of quasi-criminal charges of being
a "finger man" in a hold-up were heard first. On refusal of the Commissioner
to do so, the petitioner was tried in absentia. In the period between the first
hearing date and the second, petitioner had applied for retirement to be effective
August 2nd. The petitioner was found guilty on the charges and was dismissed
from the police force before his pension could take effect.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial in absentia on the escort charges
because the petitioner had no right to have the quasi-criminal charges heard
first. However, it reversed as to the charges of insubordination for refusal to
go to trial on June 27th. The Court gave two grounds for this reversal. First,
the Commissioner, when presiding over a hearing such as this, is functioning
as a judge, not as the defendant's superior officer and for that reason, refusal
to obey his orders is not insubordination. Secondly, it was an abuse of discretion for the Commissioner not to allow an adjournment of the June 27th
hearing.
A police officer must yield obedience to the rules and regulations of the
department; however, if he disobeys them he is entitled to a fair hearing. 13
One requirement for a fair hearing is that the accused be allowed a reasonable
adjournment if necessary for his counsel to represent him. 14 Whether a denial
of an adjournment is reasonable, depends on the case to be prepared and on
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the surrounding circumstances such as a retirement about to take effect. 15 In
Evans v. Monaghan defendants refused to withdraw their pending retirement
applications and the Court upheld expedition of the hearing in order to prevent
their retirement from taking effect, thus making the hearing a nullity. The
present case applies the same principle and does not allow an accused to
thwart the purpose of the hearing by refusing to participate in it.
DismissAL UNDER FEnImERG LAW
The Feinberg Law is New York's statutory provision for eliminating
subversive teaching personnel from the public school system.1" School officials
in New York City attempted to enforce this law by demanding that teachers
reveal names of co-workers who are or were members of the Communist Party.
The officials dismissed or suspended those refusing to name other teachers.
The reprimanded teachers appealed to the Commissioner of Education.
He decided that officials might not suspend or dismiss personnel for their
refusal to inform on their co-workers.
Pursuant to Section 1283 of the Civil Practice Act, the school officials
initiated court proceedings to review the Commissioner's determination. In
affirming the lower courts' findings the Court of Appeals, by a six to one
decision (Burke, J. dissenting) in Board of Education of City of New York v.
Allen 17 held that the commissioner's ruling was within his power and was not
arbitrary.
Section 310 of the New York Education Law, referring to appeals to the
commissioner, states that "his decision ...shall be final and conclusive, and
not subject to question or review in any place or court whatever." In interpreting Section 310 the Court of Appeals has said that "decisions by the commissioner of education are final unless purely arbitrary."' 8
Without passing on the correctness of the Commissioner's determination in
the instant case, the Court found reasonable grounds upon which his ruling
could have been based. Among these grounds was the Commissioner's assertion
that this type of interrogation engenders an atmosphere of suspicion and
uneasiness among the educators, to the detriment of the students.
The argument that enforcement of the Feinberg Law was prevented by the
Commissioner's ruling was refuted. The Court admitted that the means used
by the officials were the easiest and most efficient, but pointed out that it was
not the only reasonable means available. Unlike the courts, the Commissioner
is empowered to substitute his judgment for that of the officers whose action
he is reviewing. He could overrule one method without having to find that
it was totally unreasonable. This, the Court felt, was the import of Section 310.
Judge Burke in his dissent felt that the commissioner did not have the
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